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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Uniform Commercial Code has been in effect in Florida
since January 1, 1967, in the field of negotiable instruments, the Florida
appellate courts have not decided any cases involving articles 3 and 4 of
the Code. Various reasons may be advanced for this dearth of decisional
law, but it is submitted that the most probable reason is the backlog of
cases in the trial and appellate courts. In accordance with prior Sur-
veys1 of this area, this Survey will discuss the significant cases and the
probable effect (where relevant) of the Code on these cases.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. The materials surveyed herein extended from
201 So.2d 225 through 225 So.2d 320 and included the legislation enacted by the 1969
Regular Session of the Florida Legislature.
1. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 416 (1963) (Florida survey);
Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 225 (1965) (Florida survey); Murray,
Negotiable Instruments, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 585 (1968) (Florida survey).
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Portions of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (The Federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act of 1968)2 became effective on July 1, 1969,
and the main immediate effect of the Act has been to compel creditors
who extend consumer credit to give a full written disclosure of the
amount financed, the finance charge, the deferred payment price and the
annual percentage rate. The Federal Reserve Board has issued its Reg-
ulation Z and has attempted to explain the Act and Regulation Z in a
pamphlet obtainable from the Federal Reserve Board.' Lawyers should
note that additional provisions of the Act which deal with garnishment
of debtor's earnings will come into effect on July 1, 1970.' Lawyers
should also be aware that the Act has attempted to limit the orthodox
holder-in-due-course rule in security agreements dealing with real prop-
erty by giving the debtor a remedy against the assignee of the security
interest (mortgage) in certain situations.5
II. REAL AND PERSONAL DEFENSES
A. Venue
An interesting aspect of venue was raised in Papy v. Munroe and
Chambliss National Bank of Ocala.6 A note was executed by a corpora-
tion in Marion County. The note was indorsed by individual indorsers
in this county. Later, the individual indorsers issued renewal notes in
Dade County to the payee of the original note. The payee-holder later
filed suit on the original note in Marion County, and the indorsers
pleaded that the proper venue was in Dade County, the place where the
renewal notes were executed. The court held that the renewal notes did
not discharge the original note in the absence of any agreement that
they would be considered as a discharge, and the suit could be laid in
Marion County.
B. Acceleration and Default
No right to acceleration of a note and mortgage exists when there
have been prepayments by the mortgagor in an amount equal to or
greater than the sums that would have been due on future periodic pay-
ments if the sole failure of the mortgagor which is alleged in the com-
plaint is that he had failed to make periodic payments when due. 7 Under
the Code it would be permissible to provide for acceleration in the note
in a case of this type.8
2. Truth in lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1968). See also Fla. Laws 1969, ch.
69-370, which was amended to be consistent with the Federal Act.
3. BOARD or GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, WHAT YOU OUGHT To KNow
ABOUT FEDERAL REVENUE REGULATION Z-TRUTH IN LENDING-CONSUMER CREDIT COST
DISCLOSURE (1969).
4. Murray, The Consumer and the Code, 23 U. MmIM L. REV. 11, 53 (1968).
5. Id. at 55.
6. 204 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
7. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Pringle, 216 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-109(1), 1-208 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
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C. Parol Evidence of a Defense
Parol evidence is admissible to prove conditions which were attached
to the delivery of a promissory note and to prove that these conditions
had not occurred.9
Parol evidence is admissible to show that the parties to a mortgage
agreed that it was not to become effective until the mortgagee made cer-
tain improvements on the mortgaged property which were never made.
Parol evidence may not be used to modify a writing but it may be used
to show that the writing was subject to a condition precedent which was
not performed.'
An oral understanding between the maker and the payee of a note
that the payee will not assign or indorse the instrument will not consti-
tute the defense of conditional delivery when suit is brought by the
holder of the instrument to whom it was indorsed by the payee." The
Uniform Commercial Code provides that a holder who is not a holder
in due course takes an instrument subject to any defense based upon
nonperformance of any condition precedent, nondelivery, or delivery for
a special purpose. Conversely, a holder in due course would take free
of these defenses.' 2
D. Good Faith and Lack of Knowledge
A holder of a note who has purchased it from his own agent, who
is also the maker of the note, will be prevented from being a holder in
due course when he sues an indorser of the note.'"
In a decision based upon the pre-Code law,'4 the fourth district held
that a payee of a check cannot be a holder in due course. The holding
is not new, but the application is. A drawer gave a payee a check as a
down payment for the construction of a swimming pool. That same
day, the drawer called the payee and stated that he did not want to go
through with the project. The drawer ordered the drawee-bank to stop
payment. Two days later, the payee of the personal check exchanged it
for a cashier's check. The drawee-bank refused payment of the cashier's
check when it discovered that it had overlooked the stop-order on the
underlying personal check. The court held that a bank may dishonor a
cashier's check on the ground of lack of consideration when it is pre-
sented for payment by the payee. The court noted that a payee may
be a holder in due course under the U.C.C.; 1" however, it should be
noted that the Code's providing that a payee may be a holder in due
9. Thomson v. Parrish, 221 So.2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
10. Beach Keys, Inc. v. Girvin, 213 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
11. Collegiate Baptist Church, Inc. v. Short, 205 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
12. U.C.C. §§ 3-304, 3-306.
13. Baum v. Spector, 211 So.2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
14. Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 So.2d 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). See
Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1367 (1969); U.C.C. §§ 3-411, 3-413, 3-418.
15. U.C.C. § 3-302(2).
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course does not mean that every payee will be a holder in due course.
Good faith, lack of knowledge, and the payment of value are still re-
quired for holder in due course status.10
The mere fact that a bank was an escrow agent in a stock-promo-
tion transaction does not put it on notice of any defect or defense, nor
cause it to be in bad faith when it later takes a promissory note as an
indorsee from the payee-promoter of the stock transaction. Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law (section 674.58) the holder must either
have actual knowledge of the "infirmity" or knowledge of such facts
which show a taking in bad faith.' If this case were decided under
the Uniform Commercial Code, the result would probably be the same.'"
E. Consideration
Even though a promissory note is under seal, the defendant in a
suit on the note may assert want of consideration as an affirmative de-
fense (by an answer not under oath) and then assume the burden of
establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.' The Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that when signatures are admitted or
established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover
unless the defendant establishes a defense." This rule seems consis-
tent with the holding of this case. The court's apparent downgrading
of the importance of a seal seems consistent with the comment to sec-
tion 3-113 of the Code, which states that "[t]he revised wording is
intended to change the result of decisions holding that while a seal does
not affect the negotiability of an instrument it may affect it in other
respects falling within the statute, such as the conclusiveness of considera-
tion." Further, the U.C.C. provides that want or failure of consideration
is a defense as against any person not having the rights of a holder in
due course.21
The defense of lack of consideration cannot be asserted when suit
is brought upon notes which renewed original notes allegdly lacking
consideration.22
F. Illegality
One of the most popular gimmicks in merchandising goods to the
homeowner has consisted in selling goods on a credit arrangement where-
by the cost of the goods is supposedly paid by referrals given to the
salesman by the buyer. The buyer is to be given so many dollars credit
against his promissory not (and a security agreement) for each referral
16. U.C.C, § 3-302(2), comment 2.
17. Baraban v. Manatee Nat'l Bank, 212 So.2d 341 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
18. U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 1-201(20), 1-201(25), 3-304.
19. Powell v. Walbek, 209 So.2d 488 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
20. U.C.C. § 3-307(2).
21. U.C.C. § 3-408.
22. Economy Plumbing Co. v. Charles Sales Corp., 204 So.2d 348 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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who purchases similar goods; the buyer is led to believe that this pur-
chase will cost him nothing and he will receive a "profit." New York
has chosen to upset these "bargains" on the ground that they are uncon-
scionable under section 2-302 of the U.C.C.23 A Florida court has also
upset this arrangement, but under a different theory. Section 849.091
of the Florida Statutes forbids chain letters and pyramid clubs, and
the referral scheme in M. Lippincott Mortage Investment Co. v. Chil-
dress24 was characterized as a lottery under the statute because the
purchase of the goods was incidental to the "motive" of the buyers to
make money from the referrals. The court voided the promissory note
given by the buyers. It would appear that if sales promotion people
reshape their approach to evade this decision, they may run into the
defense of unconscionability.
In accordance with a Florida statute,25 any mortgage which is given
to satisfy the claims of existing creditors while the corporation is in-
solvent is void.26
The first district has reaffirmed the Florida rule that the payee of
a check which was given by the drawer in payment of a gambling debt
incurred in Puerto Rico, where gambling debts are legal, may not enforce
the check in Florida on the grounds of public policy. 7 The U.C.C. does
not affect this holding.28
Confession of judgment clauses in negotiable instruments are void
in Florida, but they do not affect the negotiability of the note. Set-off
provisions in notes are permissible in Florida, and when a confession
of judgment clause and a set-off provision are in a note but are severable,
the set-off provision and the note will be valid.2 9 The same result should
follow under the Code. 0
G. Joint Tenancy
A mortgage executed by one joint tenant (of a joint tenancy with
a right of survivorship) is ineffective against any of the real property
after the death of the mortgaging tenant; the surviving tenant takes
the entire property free of the mortgage."'
H. Coverture
The former Constitution of Florida provided that the separate
property of a married woman would not be liable for the debts of her
23. See Murray, The Consumer and the Code, 23 U. MIAmi L. Rlv. 11, 58-60 (1968).
24. 204 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
25. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1953).
26. J. L. Bell Co. v. Graves, 219 So.2d 740 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1969).
27. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan, 202 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
28. Even a holder in due course takes subject to the defense of "illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity." U.C.C. § 3-305 (2) (b).
29. Hawke v. Broward Nat'l Bank, 220 So.2d 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
30. See U.C.C. § 3-112(1)(d) and comment 2.
31. D.A.D., Inc. v. Moring, 218 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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husband unless she gave a written instrument executed according to
the law respecting conveyances by married women.82 The new constitu-
tion has eliminated this restrictive provision and has substituted the
following language:
Coverture and Property.-There shall be no distinction be-
tween married women and married men in the holding, control,
disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and
personal; except that dower or curtesy may be established and
regulated by law. 8
If this new constitutional provision is given a liberal construction,84 it
will result in the reversal of one case 5 which was decided in the period
encompassed within this Survey, and a long line of older cases.86 Under
the former constitution, the wife could not escape liability if a purchase-
money note and mortgage was given by the husband and wife for prop-
erty conveyed to the spouses jointly," or if the husband and wife signed
a promissory note to a bank in return for a check made out to them
jointly, even though the husband used the proceeds of the check for
his own purposes.3
In a case of first impression, 9 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, has held that when a mortgage names the husband alone, with
no reference to the wife, her signature alone is insufficient to render the
mortgage valid as against homestead property which was also held as an
estate by the entirety. It should be noted that the court adopted this view
because the facts showed that the mortgage was given as security for a
loan made to the husband's business (which the wife had refused to be-
come involved in). Further, the wife's signature was seemingly witnessed
by only one witness in fact, although the deed bore the signatures of two
witnesses. Whether the court would follow this view in the absence of
these factors, is problematical.
I. Nonnegotiability
A nonnegotiable promissory note which contains a warranty (war-
ranting that assigned oil leases would produce a certain dollar amount
per month) and a separate guaranty agreement, which provides that
the maker of the note is to pay cash or assign additional oil leases if
the original leases do not produce the warranted amount, may be con-
32. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1885).
33. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
34. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Playford, 217 So.2d 584 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) for a
liberal construction of FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
35. American Nat'l Bank v. Brantley, 204 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
36. See Murray, Accommodation Parties: A Potpourri of Problems, 22 U. MIaM L. REV.
814, 828 (1968).
37. DeLong v. Larkin, 208 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1968).
38. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Playford, 217 So.2d 584 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
39. Heath v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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strued together. When the original oil leases fail to produce the agreed
dollar amount, however, the payee has an adequate remedy at law to
sue for each month's default and the fact that this will result in a
multiplicity of actions does not authorize equity to order the maker to
assign additional oil leases to the payee. In addition, since the guaranty
was in the form of an option-the maker could pay additional cash or
assign--equity should not grant relief because the maker has the option.4"
J. Forgery
A title insurance policy which insures the validity of a mortgage
does not cover a loss sustained by the mortgagee as the result of a for-
gery of the mortgage note. Title insurance only insures against loss
resulting from a defect in the title, and it does not cover the validity of
the underlying mortgage debt.41
The third district has reaffirmed the principle that when one
joint payee of a check forges the name of the other joint payee and re-
ceives payment, the payor of the check has not made proper payment
and is liable to the payee whose name has been forged.42 The U.C.C.
continues the same rule.43
A cause of action for conversion will lie when a check made pay-
able to one collection agency is mistakenly mailed to another collection
agency and the latter agency receives payment on the check. Further,
punitive damages may be awarded for the conversion of a check when
there is fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression, gross neg-
ligence with respect to the rights of others, or where the wrong partakes
of a criminal character." The conversion concept articulated in this
case has been expressly adopted by the Code.45
K. Payment
When a principal delivers checks to its agents for transmittal to a
creditor of the principal, and the agent opens a joint bank account in
the name of the agent and the creditor (and the signature of the cre-
ditor does not appear in the bank's records) and then withdraws funds
for the agent's personal benefit, this will not constitute a payment of
the underlying debt by the principal.46
40. Bardill v. Holcomb, 215 So.2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
41. Bank of Miami Beach v. Lawyers' Title Guar. Fund, 214 So.2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1968).
42. Newman v. Shore, 206 So.2d 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). The reader is invited to read
the first five paragraphs of this opinion and then answer the question: "Why were the payees
of the notes suing the indorsers?" The court has either confused the parties in the opinion,
or it has been so cryptic that the opinion serves to confuse rather than to clarify.
43. U.C.C. § 3-116(b).
44. Adjustment Spec., Inc. v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 221 So.2d 443 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1969).
45. U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c).
46. Carberry v. Foley, 213 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1968).
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The acceptance and cashing by the payee of a check which bears
the notation "payment in full of all obligations" of the drawer will not
necessarily constitute an accord and satisfaction (upon a motion for a
summary judgment) of disputed accounts between the parties "in the ab-
sence of a conclusive showing of a genuine meeting of the minds of these
parties as to the intended effect of the check. . . ."', The Code probably
calls for the same result.48
L. Usury
The U.C.C. is not intended to have any affect on the interest and
usury laws of Florida.49 The 1969 Florida Legislature made changes
in the usury statutes which are discussed in a later section of this arti-
cle.5o
Usury statutes do not create a vested substantive right but are only
enforceable as a penalty, and until the penalty is merged into a final
judgment, these statutes may be repealed or modified. As a result, when
a lender exacted more than twenty-five-percent interest from a corporate
borrower in violation of a Florida statute and the statute was amended
during the pendency of the judicial proceedings, the court held that the
lender would merely forfeit the usurious interest and not the principal
(as would be the case before the statutory amendment). The court fur-
ther held that the statutory amendment which allows the exaction of
fifteen-percent interest from corporations (as compared to ten-percent
interest from individuals) is constitutional.5 '
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has articulated a
rather clear, simple formula for determining the question of usury. A
corporation borrowed $290,000, and $50,000 was payable at the end
of one year and the remaining $240,000 was payable at the end of the
second year. Interest of six percent per annum, payable monthly in
advance, was charged, and deferred interest and principal payments
were to bear interest at fifteen percent per annum until paid. At the
closing, the lenders deducted $29,000 as a commission and $1,450 as
advance interest for the first month. The borrower cured two defaults,
but at the end of twenty-two months it defaulted for the third time and
the lenders sued for foreclosure. The borrower alleged that since the
lender could have accelerated the entire indebtedness at the time of the
first default and since the mortgage and note did not contain any pro-
visions eliminating unearned interest, the court should apportion the
"commission," advance payment of interest and the six-percent inter-
est rate over the term of the accelerated indebtedness and that this
47. Burley v. Mummery, 222 So.2d 261, 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
48. U.C.C. § 3-603. But see Neeley v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 430 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1968).
49. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104 (1969).
50. See note 68 infra.
51. General Capital Corp. v. Tel Serv. Co., 212 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), con-
struing FLA. STATS. §§ 687.07, 687.11 (1969).
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would amount to over fifteen percent per year. The district court held
that:
the determination of whether the type of transaction involved
here is usurious is made by apportioning the reserved bonus,
commission, or interest over the period commencing with the
date of closing and ending with either the date of the decree or
the original maturity date, whichever is prior in time.52
In this case the date of the decree was subsequent to the date of matur-
ity, and the court said that the period from the date of closing to the
date of maturity should have been used in computing the amount of
interest exacted.
M. Negligence
In the absence of other facts, the mere fact that a construction
lender deducted one percent of the loan proceeds to pay for inspection
of the work while it was in progress does not create an implied contract
between the lender and the borrower that the inspection will be properly
performed for the benefit of the borrower. As a result, when the work
proves defective, the borrower may not assert the negligence of the in-
spector as a defense to a suit on the construction loan and mortgage.5 3
N. Bankruptcy
A discharge in bankruptcy of the maker of a note will not release
an indorser; however, if the holder of the note releases the maker in a
Chapter XI arrangement, the indorser will be released.54
0. Statutes of Limitations
In a case of first impression,55 the fourth district has held that a
maker of a note may testify in a suit brought by the deceased payee's
administrator that the letters "L.S." appearing after his (the maker's)
name on a promissory note were not there when he signed the instru-
ment nor did he authorize anyone to put them there. The court noted
that a maker may testify that a signature appearing on a note is a for-
gery in spite of the dead man's statute, and he should likewise be per-
mitted to deny that he sealed the instrument. This testimony was of
crucial importance because the statute of limitations on an unsealed
instrument is five years while it is twenty years on one under seal.
The U.C.C. does not provide any statute of limitations for suits on
52. Green Ridge Corp. v. South Jersey Mort. Co., 211 So.2d 70, 72 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
53. Rice v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 207 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
54. Rose v. Grable, 203 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-601, comment 1.
See Murray, Accommodation Parties: A Potpourri of Problems, 22 U. MrAmI L. Rv. 814, 834
(1968).
55. Pitts v. Pitchford, 201 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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negotiable instruments, and each state is free to follow its parochial
limitations statutes.5
Section 733.211(1) of the Florida Statutes provides for a three-
year statute of limitations for suits to be filed on claims against an estate
when the claims have "not been paid, settled or otherwise disposed
of." When the holder of a note and mortgage signed by the deceased
and his widow has filed a claim against the estate and the estate has con-
tinued payments on the mortgaged indebtedness (a lien on homestead
property), the claim does not fall within the three-year statute and the
mortgagee may collect the unpaid balance from the estate.57
P. Merger by Judgment-Joint and Several Liability
In Corcoran v. Martin,"8 the payee of a promissory note brought
an action against a corporate maker and two individual makers (husband
and wife) who had jointly and severally promised to pay. Service of
process was made on the corporation which filed defensive pleadings.
Subsequently, service of process was made on the husband and on the
wife and the corporation withdrew its pleadings, whereupon a summary
judgment for the principal, interest, attorney's fees, and costs was en-
tered against the corporate maker. A judgment for the same amounts
was entered against the individual makers. The second district held that
the three makers were jointly and severally liable and that the judgment
against the corporation was a several judgment which did not merge
the cause of action into the judgment, hence the cause of action on the
note could still be exercised against the individual makers.
A promissory note signed by two or more persons which provides
that "we promise to pay" is the joint and several obligation of the
signers, and either signer may be sued without the joinder of the other."
The U.C.C. articulates the same rule.60
Q. Estoppel and Prepayment Penalty
A chattel mortgagee who is present at negotiations between the
buyer and seller of the encumbered property and who tells the prospec-
tive buyer that he (the chattel mortgagee) has no interest in the prop-
ery will be estopped from asserting his mortgage against the buyer who
purchased the property without actual knowledge of the existence of the
recorded mortgage.6'
The holder of a note and mortgage which provides for a penalty
56. See U.C.C. § 3-113, comment.
57. Gibbons v. Crowder, 208 So.2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
58. 202 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
59. Forbes v. National Rating Bureau, Inc., 223 So.2d 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
60. U.C.C. § 3-118(e).
61. Scotti v. Maysles, 202 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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for prepayment is not entitled to the prepayment penalty when the en-
cumbered property is taken by eminent domain proceedings.62
R. Legislation
The "home improvement" industry has been a prolific source of
fraudulent activities in many states; the "aluminum siding" cases alone
would fill a law school casebook. In the typical case, the home improve-
ment company uses high pressure tactics to induce people to sign re-
modeling contracts, promissory notes, and mortgages in return for work
of inferior quality. Usually the homeowner signs incomplete negotiable
instruments which the company later fills in to its advantage, and often
the home owners do not even realize they are signing promissory notes
and mortgages and only learn of their mistake when they are given no-
tice by an alleged holder in due course of their negotiable instrument.
Hopefully, many of these abuses will be curtailed by the effective en-
forcement of the Florida Home Improvement Sales and Finance Act,63
which minutely regulates the activities of home improvement companies.
A complete discussion of this Act is beyond the scope of this Survey;
however, two sections are relevant-sections 520.74 and 520.30 of the
Florida Statutes. Section 520.74(1) prohibits any home improvement
contract from containing any clause whereby the homeowner agrees not
to assert against any assignee of the contract any defense which he may
have against the contractor. The next subsection 4 prohibits the holder
of the contract from arbitrarily and without reasonable cause accelerat-
ing the maturity of any part or all of the amount owing in the absence
of the buyer's default in the performance of any of his obligations. Fi-
nally, a third subsection prohibits the contract from requiring a note or
series of notes by the buyer "which, when separately negotiated, will
cut off as to third parties any right of action or defense which the buyer
may have against the home improvement contractor."65 The second sec-
tion provides:
Every promissory note or mortgage shall bear on the side of
the note or mortgage which contains the maker's signature the
following legend in at least ten (10) point boldface type: "pay-
ment of this note or mortgage is subject to the terms of a home
improvement installment contract of even date between maker
and payee or mortgagor and mortgagee."66
It is obvious that if any home improvement promissory note contains
the words (as required by the act) "payment of this note or mortgage
is subject to the terms of a home improvement installment contract" it
62. Assoc. Schools, Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
63. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-44.
64. FLA. STAT. § 520.74(2) (1969).
65. FLA. STAT. § 520.74(7) (1969).
66. FLA. STAT. § 520.30 (1969).
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will not be negotiable and the finance company which takes this note
will be a mere assignee. 67 What will be the result, however, if a con-
tractor fails to place this legend upon the note and negotiates it? It is
submitted that if the indorsee-finance company takes without knowledge
of the home improvement source of the note, in good faith and for value,
it can be a holder in due course. Of course, it would be difficult in the
ordinary case for the indorsee-finance company to show that it did not
know that its indorser was in the home improvement game, and the
Florida courts will, no doubt, be hostile to any "white heart-empty
head" assertion by the finance company.
In an effort to eliminate loan sharking and shylocking activities,
the legislature has provided that the wilful and knowing "extension of
credit" at a rate exceeding twenty-five percent but not more than forty-
five percent per annum shall constitute a misdemeanor and that any
extension of credit for more than forty-five percent per annum shall con-
stitute a felony."8 Further, any knowing or wilful "extortionate exten-
sion of credit" (use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm
to a person or his reputation or property for his delay or failure to make
repayment) will constitute a felony to be punished by not more than
ten years imprisonment or a $10,000 fine, or both.6"
Minors between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one may now sign
valid promissory notes in order to borrow money for educational pur-
poses, provided that the simple rate of interest does not exceed seven
percent per annum. 70
III. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES; DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
AND OTHER RELIEF
It is somewhat surprising to discover that during these allegedly
prosperous times, eleven mortgage-foreclosure cases directly or indi-
rectly involving actual or potential deficiency judgments (or some other
type of supplemental relief in addition to foreclosure) were decided.
The mere fact that a holder of a promissory note which is secured
by a mortgage sues on the note and secures a judgment does not consti-
tute an abandonment of his rights under the mortgage nor an election of
remedies which precludes him from subsequently suing to foreclose the
mortgage when the judgment has not been paid.7'
When an automobile is sold by a conditional sales contract under
the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, the conditional vendor (or its as-
signee) may repossess the automobile, sell it, and then sue for a deficiency
judgment against the conditional vendee under former section 520.11 of
67. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1)(b), 3-105(2) (a).
68. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135, amending FLA. STAT. ch. 687 (1967).
69. Id.
70. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-105, amending FLA. STAT. § 743.05 (1967).
71. Klondike, Inc. v. Blair, 211 So.2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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the Florida Statutes.72 It should be noted, however, that section 520.11
was repealed by the adoption of the U.C.C. 73 However, the U.C.C. has
adopted the rule that the creditor may repossess the collateral, sell it,
and then sue for a deficiency judgment against the debtor.7 ,
A possibility that a resale of foreclosed property will result in a
higher price is not an adequate ground for ordering a resale in the ab-
sence of any irregularity in the original sale.75
In affirming the Third District Court of Appeal, the Supreme
Court of Florida has held that the bid price in a foreclosure sale con-
ducted under chapter 702 of the Florida Statutes is final insofar as the
sale of the property is concerned. This bid price, however, "is not con-
clusive as to the value of the property in a subsequent law action for a
judgment at law upon the note."70
The Second District Court of Appeal has held that when fore-
closed property is sold by the clerk of the circuit court under the pro-
visions of section 702.02 (5) of the Florida Statutes, the foreclosure sales
price does not conclusively establish the value of the mortgaged prop-
erty so as to bar evidence of value offered by the mortgagor against
whom a deficiency judgment or decree is sought. This is true even
though the mortgagor has made no objection to the sales price within
the period specified in the above statute. The court noted that "[a]n
interpretation that would permit the statutory provision to thus restrict
[restrict an equity court's power to prevent unfairness, injustice and
fraud] the basic and inherent nature of the court's function should and
would render the legislation invalid. ' 77 It is submitted that the court
raised a red herring; the legislature merely provided a clear, simple
method of ascertaining the value of mortgaged property which the court
invalidated even though the mortgagor did nothing to protect his own
interests under the statute.
When a complaint for mortgage foreclosure contains a prayer for
general relief and the chancellor reserves jurisdiction in the foreclosure
decree to enter a deficiency decree, the chancellor may enter such a
decree more than ten days after the sale of the mortgaged property.78
If a mortgagee should foreclose a mortgage and not ask for a de-
ficiency decree, it is permissible for the court, in a subsequent law action
for the deficiency, to add to the amount of the deficiency interest com-
puted from the date of the foreclosure sale in the original equity action.79
72. General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Hurst, 212 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1968).
73. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-102(1) (1967).
74. U.C.C. §§ 9-504, 9-505.
75. Connelly v. Wintermantel, 211 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
76. R. K. Cooper Constr. Co. v. Fulton, 216 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1968) (emphasis supplied
by the court), aff'g Fulton v. R. K. Cooper Constr. Co., 208 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
77. Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 202 So.2d 226,
230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
78. Boyles v. Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 201 So.2d 909 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
79. Maudo, Inc. v. Stein, 201 So.2d 821 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). It might be noted that this
suit involved the granting of a deficiency judgment on a purchase-money mortgage.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
When a receiver of a corporation receives refunds as late payments
on the corporation's ordinary business assets which were subject to a
mortgage which has been foreclosed, the mortgagee (who was the suc-
cessful bidder at the foreclosure sale) has a prior claim to these funds
as against the claim of the United States for unpaid income taxes when
the tax lien was filed after foreclosure but before the receipt of the refund
checks.80
In Watson v. Vafides,8' the mortgagor entered the highest bid at a
foreclosure sale, but he was unable to produce the cash when he was
asked to do so by the clerk of the circuit court. The clerk then accepted
a new bid from Watson, a judgment creditor of the mortgagor, in an
amount $11,000 lower than Watson had bid at the original public sale.
The chancellor refused to confirm the sale and ordered that a new public
sale be made. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed
and held that when the highest bidder is unable to produce the cash
amount of his bid, the person conducting the sale may resell the prop-
erty before the original bidders disperse. If the original bidders have
dispersed, then the resale may be made only by the publication of
notice of the time and place to the public.
Unless the question of unpaid taxes has been adjudicated in mort-
gage-foreclosure proceedings, the buyer of the property has no right to
claim that surplus funds remaining after the payment of the mortgage
debt should be used to pay these taxes, and these surplus funds will
be subject to a judgment creditor of the mortgagor."
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Under a promissory note which provides:
In the event this note is placed in the hands of an attor-
ney for collection, or in case the holder shall become a party
either as plaintiff or as defendant in any suit or legal proceed-
ing in relation to the property described or the lien created in
the mortgage securing payment of this indebtedness or for the
recovery or protection of said indebtedness, the maker hereof
will repay on demand all costs and expense arising therefrom,
including reasonable attorney's fees, with interest thereon at
the rate of 10 percent per annum until paid, 3
it is error to award attorney's fees based solely upon the face amount
of the instrument when the attorney's services were necessary in litiga-
tion involving the holder (either as a plaintiff or a defendant) in relation
to property (which secured the note) or for the recovery or protection
80. United States v. Whyte, 216 So.2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
81. 212 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
82. Cohen v. Keyes Co., 212 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
$3. Holcomb v. Bardill, 214 So.2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist, 1968),
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of the indebtedness. Attorney's fees should be awarded for work in-
volved in the overall transaction.
A mortgagee who is a named beneficiary under a mortgage clause
in an insurance policy is entitled to an award of attorney's fees when
he proceeds against the insurance company after a casualty loss to the
insured property.84
In a case of first impression, the fourth district has held that a
contractual clause in a mortgage providing for attorney's fees for col-
lection "whether by foreclosure or otherwise" permits an appellate court
to award attorney's fees for services rendered in prosecuting or defend-
ing an appeal from a foreclosure decree.85
V. ACCOMMODATION INDORSERS
An interesting aspect of accommodation indorsements was involved
in Beardmore v. Abbott. 6 A life insurance salesman sold a large policy
of insurance to a client. The client was unable to pay the first year's
premium and borrowed money on a promissory note from a bank for
the amount of the premium. The agent signed the note as an accommo-
dation party, and the bank held the life insurance policy as collateral.
The insured was unable to pay the second annual premium, and he de-
faulted on the note. The bank applied the cash value of the policy against
the note and demanded the difference from the accommodation indorser.
the accommodation indorser-agent received for selling the policy consti-
for indemnification. The insured alleged that the failure of the accom-
modation indorser to tell the insured the amount of the commission that
the accommodation indorser agent received for selling the policy consti-
tuted a breach of faith and would be a defense to the suit. The court
held that there was no duty to disclose the amount of the commission,
and the fact that a commission was received did not constitute the re-
ceiving of value by the indorser so as to deprive him of his right of
indemnification as an accommodation indorser.
A person who signs a note immediately below the signature of the
maker after the note is in default and at the request of the original
maker who was advised by the holder that he would sue the original
maker unless he produced a cosigner "to guarantee the payments""7
is an accommodation party for the maker, and both of them may be
joined as defendants in the same suit by the holder.
84. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sisung, 202 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
85. Empress Homes, Inc. v. Levin, 201 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967). See United
Bonding Ins. Co. v. Inter Nat'l Bank, 221 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), which deals with the
question of attorney's fees when the promissory note provides for them while a surety bond
for the payment of the note does not.
86. 218 So.2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
87. Ebeling v. Lowry, 203 So.2d 506 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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VI. BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
A. Statutory Controls
A minority stockholder in a bank does not have a right to inspect
the bank's stock book which contains the names, addresses, and num-
ber of shares owned by all of the bank's stockholders."8
The Florida Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity
of section 665.02(1) of the Florida Statutes, which forbids any cor-
poration from using the word "savings" as part of its title or name un-
less the corporation is organized under the provisions of the law relating
to building and loan associations."9 The court approved a decree enjoining
the Greater Miami Financial Corporation from doing business under
the fictitious name of Greater Miami Savings Center." The court held,
however, that section 659.52(1) of the Florida Statutes (which forbids
nonbanking corporations or persons from soliciting or receiving deposits,
or from advertising that they are accepting deposits and issuing notes
or certificates therefor) does not apply to a corporation which does not
accept deposits for which it has any responsibility. The Greater Miami
Savings Center never received funds from its customers, and its pri-
mary function was to put its customers in touch with savings institu-
tions which pay a high rate of interest. It operated as a broker for the
transfer of money from its customers to savings and loan associations
located in foreign states. The Greater Miami Savings Center did not
pay interest, issue or honor checks drawn upon it, issue savings account
passbooks, lend money, or charge interest; it had none of the characteris-
tics of a savings and loan association.
B. General and Special Deposits
The Supreme Court of Florida, in affirming the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, has held that when a deposit of money
is made in a bank in the name of a depositor with the words "trustee"
or "as trustee" appearing after the depositor's name, this puts the bank
on notice that the money deposited may be the property of a third per-
son. The bank may not, therefore, set-off against the deposit debts which
may be owing by the depositor to the bank in the absence of an inquiry
to determine whether the trustee does in fact have the right to use these
funds for his personal obligations.9
An attorney who is holding his client's funds in a trust account for
a specific purpose (to be paid to the client's wife in a divorce matter)
88. White v. Campbell, 215 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968), construing FLA. STAT.
§ 659.25 (1967).
89. Greater Miami Fin']. Corp. v. Dickinson, 214 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1968).
90. Id.
91. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Emile, 216 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1968), aff'g Emile v.
Bright, 203 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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does not have a retaining lien for a fee on these funds, and, as a result,
the judgment-creditor wife may garnish these funds in the hands of the
attorney.92
C. Payment and Collection of Items
A bank is not liable for erroneously paying a postdated check in
advance of the date unless the drawer notifies the bank in writing of
the complete description of the check, including the payee's name, the
date, the number, and the amount thereof." If the drawer intends to
stop payment, he must then deliver a written stop order to the bank in
accordance with the requirements of section 674.4-403 of the Florida
Statutes.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,9" a drawee-bank is not
liable to the holder of a check until and unless it accepts or certifies the
check. Therefore, the Second District Court of Appeal has held that
a holder who has been refused payment by the drawee-bank may not
sue in tort for malicious interference with a business transaction; a
tort theory (rather than a contract theory) may not be used to circum-
vent the obvious purpose of the statute. 5 The U.C.C. has virtually re-
adopted the N.I.L. language, and this decision should remain intact.9 6
The proper venue for a suit on a dishonored cashier's check is in
the county where the issuing bank is located and not in the county
where the payee resides.9"
D. Joint Checking and Savings Accounts
Parol evidence may be introduced to show that a husband had
created an estate by the entireties in a checking account when he changed
it from his personal account to an account in the names of his wife and
himself, even though the signature cards did not contain any language
as to the nature of the account.9 8
The Second District Court of Appeal held that when a wife's fed-
eral savings account is subsequently changed to a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship with her husband, and the signature card provides
that any deposit by one party "shall be conclusively intended to be a
gift and delivery at that time of such funds"99 to the other party and
that the association could accept checks for deposit made out to only
92. Wilkerson v. Olcott, 212 So.2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
93. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Dental, 210 So.2d 241 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) construing FLA.
STAT. § 659.36 (1969).
94. FLA. STAT. § 676.52 (1965).
95. Elmore v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 221 So.2d 164 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
96. U.C.C. §§ 3-409, 3-411.
97. Bank of Hallendale v. Joe W. Sullivan's Concrete Serv., Inc., 216 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1968), construing FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1967).
98. Hilton v. Upton, 204 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
99. Brees v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 217 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See
Graham v. Ducote Fed. Credit Union, 213 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), which held that
there was sufficient evidence to show that a daughter had created a valid inter vivos gift of a
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one of the spouses with the right of the association to add missing in-
dorsements, the association is not liable to the heirs of the wife because
it permitted the husband to withdraw all of the funds from the account.
This holding was seemingly based upon section 665.15 of the Florida
Statutes, and it was restricted to the question of nonliability of the as-
sociation. Query: Will this statute protect the husband if he is sued by
the heirs of the wife?
A deposit by the wife of a check made payable to her husband in
their joint account after his death and in the absence of any prior in-
struction by him to deposit it to his sole account would be proper only if
the husband had made a gift of the check to the wife. The wife would
then have the burden of proof of showing that a gift was in fact made. 100
The probate court does not have jurisdiction to determine the
ownership rights to an uncashed check which bears the names of a
husband and wife as payees. Only the circuit court has the power in ap-
propriate proceedings to determine whether the deceased payees held
the check as an estate by the entirety or as an estate in common. 1 1
E. Garnishment
A garnishment of the bank account of an alleged debtor should
be dissolved by the court when it is shown that the debtor has assets
independent of the bank account sufficient to pay the creditor's claim
and the creditor has admittedly failed to investigate the extent of the
debtor's assets.0 2
When service of process of a writ of garnishment has been made
upon an employee of the corporate garnishee but not upon an officer,
director, or general manager and the garnishee has failed to file an answer
resulting in a default judgment being entered against it, the court should
set aside the default when the garnishee shows that, if the writ had been
served on a proper person, proper attention would have been given to
it. 0 3
F. Prohibited Loans
An interesting application of the dichotomy between a savings and
loan association and the holding corporation which controled it was in-
volved in Central Savings Association v. Central Plaza Bank & Trust
Co.' 4 A Kansas savings and loan association was controlled by Tower
Credit Corporation. Tower borrowed money from a Florida bank which
required that the Kansas savings and loan association acquire and main-
joint share account in a credit union between herself, her mother, and her brother by the
terms of a joint share account agreement executed by the three parties, even though the
mother and brother never deposited or withdrew funds from the account, and the daughter
kept possession of the passbook.
100. Sharps v. Sharps, 214 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
101. Constant v. Tillitson, 214 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
102. Bertman v. Kurtell & Co., 205 So.2d 685 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
103. F. W. Dodge Co. v. Southern Indus. Sav. Bank, 207 So.2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
104. 223 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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tain a certificate of deposit as collateral for the loan to Tower. Tower
defaulted and the Florida bank applied the certificate of deposit against
the defaulted loan. The appellate court held that federal law pro-
hibits the loan association from making any loan or extension of
credit to any company owning it, and that the certificate of deposit
could not be applied in satisfaction of the debt owed by Tower.
G. Duty of Nondisclosure
In a case of first impression in Florida, 05 the Third District Court
of Appeal has held that there is an implied contractual duty between a
bank and its depositors that the bank will not disclose information to
third parties concerning the accounts of its depositors without their con-
sent and that the bank is liable for damages for negligently, intention-
ally, or maliciously disclosing this information. In dicta the court recog-
nized that disclosure may be made when it is compelled by court order,
general credit information between banks, disclosures required by law,
etc.
H. Legislation
Chapter 665 and portions of chapters 666 and 667 have been
repealed by a new act dealing with Florida savings and loan associa-
tions." 6 Space limitations do not permit an extended discussion of this
thirty-six page, fine-print act which is designed to control the formation,
operation, and dissolution of state savings and loan associations. Some
discussion, however, of sections which may affect the general public
would seem to be in order. First, although the act is directed primarily
at state savings and loan associations, it permits the conversion of a
state association into a federal savings and loan association, and vice
versa.'0 7 This somewhat hybrid approach is further developed in sec-
tion 26, which authorizes savings accounts by married women and mi-
nors in state as well as federal savings and loan associations and provides
that married women and minors may withdraw from their accounts as
if they are sui juris. A parent of a minor account holder, however, may
notify the association in writing not to let the minor withdraw or other-
wise deal with the account without the joinder of the parent or guardian.
Section 27 also applies to joint accounts in both state and federal sav-
ings and loan associations, and it provides that when an account is
payable to two or more persons or the survivor or survivors, then, in
the absence of fraud or undue influence, the money may be paid to
either person or to the survivor. The troublesome question of whether
a gift was intended seems to have been provided for:
105. Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
106. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-39, § 52, which provides that no tax shall be imposed on any
savings and loan association "which is greater than the least onerous imposed by that state on
any other financial institution" has received widespread condemnation in the Florida press,
and it will probably be amended.
107. Id. § 6.
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The opening of the account in such form shall, in the absence
of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence in any ac-
tion or proceeding to which either the association or the sur-
vivor or survivors is a party, of the intention of all of the
parties to the account to vest title to such account and the
additions thereto in such survivor or survivors."'
In addition, all of the parties to an account may deliver written instruc-
tions to the association providing that the signatures of more than one
tenant during their lifetime or more than one survivor shall be required
to make any withdrawals from the account and the association must
abide by this instruction. Section 30 provides that when an account
holder is adjudicated incompetent, the association (whether state or
federal) may pay or deliver the withdrawal value of the account and
accrued earnings to the guardian upon proof of his appointment and
qualification. If the association has not received written notice, however,
and is not on actual notice that its account holder has been adjudicated
incompetent, it may pay the funds from the account to the holder and the
receipt or acquittance of such holder shall be a valid and sufficient re-
lease and discharge of the association for the payment.
Any Florida bank now has the power to make loans or to extend
credit to any person, firm, or corporation in amounts not exceeding
$5,000 for each such loan or extension of credit on a credit card or
overdraft financing arrangement. The interest rate may not exceed one
and one-half percent per month simple interest on the unpaid balance
of any loan or extension of credit computed on a monthly cycle. 1""
Banks which are depositories of the funds of the state or any po-
litical subdivision, municipality, commission, board, or body need not
provide any security for these funds to the extent that the deposits are
insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Further, any notes,
bonds, or other securities, other than shares of stock, in which a state
bank is authorized by law or regulation to invest any of its funds shall
be accepted as satisfactory security for the deposit of state and municipal
funds."
All state banks are required to maintain a cash reserve of at least
twenty percent of their total deposit liability. This cash reserve may
include cash on hand, cash on demand deposit with other banks, or in-
vestments in securities which are direct obligations of the United States
or which are fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United
States."'
Section 659.52 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
bank holding companies registered under the United States Bank Hold-
108. Id. § 27.
109. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-339, amending FLA. STAT. § 659 (1967).
110. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-185, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.24 (1967).
111. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-191, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.16 (1967).
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ing Company Act of 1956 may utilize a name or title which contains
the words "bank," "banker," or "banking," or any plural form thereof." 2
Section 659.17 of the Florida Statutes was substantially reworded in
providing for loans to officers and directors and to other persons insofar
as the percentage of the loan to the unimpaired capital and surplus of
banks and trust companies is concerned. The amended statute also pro-
vides for the documentation required in first-mortgage loans on real
estate and permits second-mortgage loans in certain situations."'
Section 656.24(2)(f) of the Florida Statutes was amended to re-
move the former limitation on investment of the funds of industrial
savings banks in federal intermediate credit bank consolidated trust
debentures, federal home loan bank consolidated notes, central bank
cooperatives, and federal land bank bonds.114
I. Totten Trusts
Chapter 689 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
when the settlor is made sole trustee, the trust instrument shall be exe-
cuted in accordance with the formalities for the execution of wills re-
quired at the time of the execution of the trust instrument in the
jurisdiction where the trust instrument is executed." 5 Under a literal
construction of this statute it would appear that any instrument creating
a Totten trust in a savings account in a bank would have to comply with
the above formalities or be deemed invalid. The author has been informed
that immediately after the passage of this statute, banks and savings and
loan associations went through a short period of panic and were com-
pelled to have their old depositors enter into amended Totten trusts.
Fortunately, this statute was amended a few months later to provide
that it was not applicable to bank and savings and loan association ac-
counts, share accounts, certificates of deposit, etc." 6
VII. BAD CHECK LAWS
Section 832.05 (3) of the Florida Statutes provides that it is a crime
to obtain goods or other things of value by means of a check when the
maker does not have sufficient funds on deposit to pay the check. The
same subsection provides that no crime may be charged when the
payee knows that the drawer of the check did not have sufficient funds on
deposit to pay the check. The ingenious defendant in George v. State" 7
contended that inasmuch as he had drawn a check payable to himself
as payee and then indorsed the check to indorsees in return for goods
112. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-227, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.52 (1967).
113. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-297, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.17 (1967).
114. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-330, amending FLA. STAT. § 656.24(2) (f) (1967).
115. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-192, adding FLA. STAT. § 689.075(2) (1969).
116. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-1747, amending FLA. STAT. § 689.075(2) (1969) (special
session of the Legislature).
117. 203 So.2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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and money, he was not guilty because he, as payee, knew that his account
could not cover the check. The court stated that under a liberal construc-
tion of this statute, the word payee was intended to encompass not only
the nominal payee on the check but any person (indorsee) to whom it was
passed. The actions of the defendant came within the ambit of the stat-
ute's criminal charge and his conviction was affirmed.
